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INTRODUCTION
The Amici Curiae submit this Brief in support of Appellees should the Court
reach the merits of the case. On the merits, Amici urge the Court to uphold
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to
enact section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or
the “Act”).1 That section requires that, with certain exceptions, all Americans who
can afford a minimum level of health insurance either purchase such insurance or
pay a penalty to the United States Treasury.2
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE3
Amici Curiae are professors and scholars in economics who have taught,
studied, and researched the economic forces operating in and affecting the health
care and health insurance markets. The Economic Scholars include internationally
recognized scholars in economics, including three Nobel laureates,4 two recipients
of the John Bates Clark Medal for the outstanding American economist aged 40
1

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
2

26 U.S.C. § 5000A (minimum coverage provision).

3

Counsel for Appellants and for Appellees have consented to Amici filing this
Brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any
party, person, or entity other than Amici and their counsel, make a monetary
contribution to the preparation and submission of this Brief. See Fed. R. App. P.
29(c)(5).
4

The Nobel Laureates are Dr. Kenneth Arrow (1972), Dr. George Akerlof (2001),
and Dr. Eric Maskin (2007).
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and under,5 and former high-ranking economists in a number of prior
administrations. The Amici believe that reform of the health care system is
essential to constraining the growth of health care spending and that broadly-based
insurance coverage is essential to any reform of the health care system in this
country.
This Brief describes the unique economics of the health care industry and
explains the logical incoherence of assertions that a person can be “inactive” or a
non-participant in the health care market. Virtually all Americans will, at some
time during their life, require health care, either because of illness, accident, or the
wear and tear of age. The extremely high costs of health care for all but the most
routine treatments and procedures are beyond the means of all but the wealthiest
Americans. Insurance is how we pay for our health care, and the requirements of
section 1501 assure that all Americans who can afford it will contribute to the costs
of their own health care by maintaining reasonable insurance coverage. Otherwise
those costs will necessarily be borne by others who do buy insurance or by the
taxpayers. As former Massachusetts Governor Romney noted when signing the
Massachusetts equivalent of section 1501:
Some of my libertarian friends balk at what looks like an
individual mandate. But remember, someone has to pay
5

The winners of the John Bates Clark Medal are Dr. Susan Athey (2007) and Dr.
Matthew Rabin (2001).

-2-
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for the health care that must, by law, be provided: Either
the individual pays or the taxpayers pay. A free ride on
the government is not libertarian.6
Amici also show why upholding section 1501 will not result in some vast
expansion of federal power, and respond to the economic analysis advanced by the
“Amici Economists in Support” in State of Florida, et al., v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services,7 and largely accepted by the Eleventh Circuit.8 The
data underlying that analysis are flawed, and the analysis fails to recognize that
section 1501 is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity . . .”
designed to make health care insurance available to the vast majority of
Americans.9

6

Mitt Romney, Health Care for Everyone? We Found A Way, WALL ST. J., Apr.
11, 2006, at A16, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114472206077422547.html/mod=opinion_main_c
ommentaries.
7

See Brief for Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Appellees/Cross Appellants
and Affirmance, Dkt. Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir. filed May 11, 2011)
(“Amici Br.”).
8

Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3519178,
Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (“Florida v. HHS”).
9

Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotations
omitted).

-3-
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ARGUMENT
The District Court dismissed Appellants’ complaint on ripeness and standing
grounds and did not reach the merits of the case. 10 On this appeal, Appellants
challenge not only the District Court’s procedural holdings, but also urge this
Court to reach the merits.11
Amici are submitting this brief in the event the Court reaches the merits and
to explain both the economic factors that make the provision of health care in the
United States unique and how the provisions of section 1501 directly facilitate
Congress’ efforts to reform the health care market. Spreading the costs across the
broad spectrum of those who will require health care is essential to any
comprehensive regulatory framework for that market.
Appellants’ argue, incorrectly, that the decision not to purchase health
insurance is “inactivity,” that Congress lacks the power under the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses to regulate that decision, and that upholding section
1501 would usurp the power reserved to the States and the people by the Tenth
Amendment.
Although the decision to forego insurance has the superficial appearance of
“inaction,” it is, from an economic perspective, nothing of the kind. It is an act
10

Kinder v. Geithner, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 1:10-cv-00101, slip op. at 21 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 26, 2011).
11

See Brief of Appellants at 39-45.

-4-
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that effectively shifts the burden of paying for inevitable medical problems to
others, substantially affecting the cost of health care and the overall operation of
the interstate health care and health insurance markets. Section 1501 is a tailored
response designed to ensure that all who can afford it bear a share of the cost of the
medical treatments they will inevitably need, rather than imposing those costs
largely or entirely on others. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held:
The activity of foregoing health insurance and attempting to cover the
cost of health care needs by self-insuring is no less economic than the
activity of purchasing an insurance plan. Thus, the financing of health
care services, and specifically the practice of self-insuring, is
economic activity.12
I.

The Unique Economics of the Health Care Industry Make the Minimum
Coverage Provision Necessary
Economists have long recognized that health care has unique characteristics

not found in other markets. Indeed, health care violates almost all of the
requirements for markets to yield first best outcomes (“Pareto optimality”).13 One
requirement for market optimality is that people know what they need, and have
full information about how to obtain it. With health care, by contrast, need is
12

See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2556039, No. 102388, at *11 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (“Thomas More Law Ctr. II”); accord
Florida v. HHS, 2011 WL 3519178, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067, at *83-117
(Marcus, J., dissenting); Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 30; Liberty Univ., Inc. v.
Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010).
13

Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, Am.
Econ. Review, Dec. 1963, at 941-973; N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of
Economics (5th ed. 2009).

-5-
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unpredictable and information – particularly about the costs of treatment – is far
from complete.
Moreover, optimality requires that individuals’ actions affect only
themselves. This is again not true of health care, where individuals’ actions have
effects far beyond themselves – both directly (by spreading communicable
diseases, for example) and indirectly (by not being insured and thus shifting costs
to others, for example).
Optimality in a market also requires vigorous competition on the part of
providers. Because of substantial market imperfections in medical care, however,
a variety of constraints are imposed on medical care providers, including licensing
requirements and regulation of the provider-patient relationship. Structural factors
in the markets for health care, such as the limited number of hospitals and primary
care physicians, are also inconsistent with perfect competition. As a result of these
market failures, economists do not approach the health care industry with the
deference to individual choice or the expectations of optimality that they do in
other markets.
These market failures are the foundation for the field of health economics
and have been studied for decades. The paper that launched the field nearly a half
century ago notes that
[t]he failure of the market to insure against uncertainties has created many
social institutions in which the usual assumptions of the market are to some
-6-
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extent contradicted. The medical profession is only one example, though in
many respects an extreme one.14
That remains true today. Of particular relevance to this case, economists
who have studied health care and health insurance for many decades have
concluded that it is incorrect to say that people who do not purchase health
insurance do not participate in or affect the markets for medical care and health
insurance. Rather, all participate in the markets for medical services and
necessarily affect the market for health insurance. This conclusion is based on
three observations:
1.

People cannot avoid medical care with certainty, or be sure that
they can pay for the costs of care if uninsured

Everyone gets sick or suffers an injury at some point in life. When they do,
they generally need and receive medical care. Sickness, and especially injury, is
often unforeseen. People need medical care because of accidents, life situations
beyond their control (e.g., cancer, a mental health emergency), unexpected
outcomes (e.g., chronic care medications fail to stem a disease), or the normal
aging process (e.g., joint replacement, Alzheimer’s disease, congestive heart
failure). Thus, even if people do not intend to use medical care, they often end up
using it anyway. According to the Medical Expenditure Panel Study, the leading
source of data on national medical spending, 57 percent of the 40 million people
14

Arrow, supra n.13, at 967.

-7-
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uninsured in all of 2007 used medical services that year.15 By another metric, even
the best risk adjustment systems used to predict medical spending explain only 25
to 35 percent of the variation in the costs different individuals incur; 16 the vast
bulk of spending needs cannot be forecast.
Moreover, because medical care is so expensive, essentially everyone
requires funds beyond their own resources in order to afford it. In 2007, the
average person used $6,305 in personal health care services,17 which is over 10
percent of the median family’s income that year and approximately 20 percent of
the median family’s financial assets.18 Even routine medical procedures, such as

15

Agency for Health Care Quality and Research, Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, Summary Data Tables tbl. 1 (hereinafter AHQR Tables), available at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/tables_compendia_hh_interactive.j
sp?_SERVICE=MEPSSocket0&_PROGRAM=MEPSPGM.TC.SAS&File=HCFY
2007&Table=HCFY2007%5FPLEXP%5F%40&VAR1=AGE&VAR2=SEX&VA
R3=RACETH5C&VAR4=INSURCOV&VAR5=POVCAT07&VAR6=MSA&VA
R7=REGION&VAR8=HEALTH&VARO1=4+17+44+64&VARO2=1&VARO3=
1&VARO4=1&VARO5=1&VARO6=1&VARO7=1&VARO8=1&_Debug=.
16

Ross Winkelman and Syed Mahmud, A Comparative Analysis of Claims-Based
Tools for Health Risk Assessment, Society of Actuaries (Apr. 20, 2007), available
at http://www.soa.org/research/research-projects/health/hlth-risk-assement.aspx.
17

Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Historic National Health Expenditure
Data, NHE Web Tables, available at
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAccountsHisto
rical.asp#TopOfPage.
18

Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Survey of Current Business,
Feb. 2009, at A2-A56. Houses are not counted toward one’s “financial assets.”

-8-
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MRIs, CT scans, colonoscopies, mammograms, and childbirth, to name a few, cost
more than many Americans can afford.19
Those suffering from many common, but costly, medical problems spend
substantially more. For example, medical costs in the year after a colorectal cancer
diagnosis average $25,000, even before expensive new medications;20 pancreatic
cancer treatment costs about $57,000;21 and treatment of a heart attack for 90 days
cost over $20,000 in 1998.22 All told, ranking everyone on the basis of medical
spending, including those who did not use any care, the costs for the top one
percent of that distribution equaled $85,000 on average. 23 This amount is 46

19

The Amici Economists argue that these numbers overstate the medical expenses
of the “young, healthy individuals” who are the target of the mandate. Amici Br.,
supra n.7, at 13. However, even the young and healthy incur medical expenses
beyond the means of most Americans. For example, in 2008, the average inhospital cost for a normal live birth was $7,933 with other physician expenses of
$1,380. AHQR, supra n.15, at tbl. 3-A (2008 Mean Expenses per Person with
Care for Selected Conditions by Type of Service), available at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_results.jsp?Action=S
earch&SearchMethod=1&component=1&subcomponent=0&tableSeries=2&year=1.
20

K. Robin Yabroff et al., Costs of Care for Elderly Cancer Patients in the United
States, J. of the Nat’l Cancer Institute, Apr. 29, 2008, at 630-41.
21

Id.

22

David M. Cutler and Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine
Worth It?, Health Affairs, September/October 2001, at 11-29.
23

Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending (Mar.
2009), available at www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf; AHQR, supra
n.15.
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percent above median family income and nearly three times the financial assets of
the median family. Indeed, this amount – $85,000 – exceeds the total financial
assets of all but the very well-to-do.24 Accordingly, it is very difficult for anyone
to commit to paying for medical care on their own, and only the exceptionally
wealthy can even consider doing so.
The combination of the uncertainty of need and the high cost of care when
needed highlights the fundamental distinction that health economists make
between health insurance and medical care. Medical care is the set of services that
improve or maintain one’s health. Health insurance is a mechanism for spreading
the costs of that medical care across people – so that some people contribute to the
cost of providing care to others in return for obtaining that contribution from others
when they need care – or over time – mitigating the risk of facing overwhelming
costs at a particular time by substituting a lower, regular premium cost over a
longer period. The decision to regulate health insurance is not based on any
normative view about the benefits of medical care for any particular person.
2.

Other legislation mandates access to a minimum level of health
care for all who seek it, even those who cannot pay

24

Bucks et al., supra, n.18, at A27. This study reports that the median value of the
direct and indirect stock holdings of all families with income below the 90th
percentile was $62,000 in 2007. Indirect stock holdings include pooled investment
trusts, retirement accounts, and other managed accounts.
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Existing federal legislation requires care to be provided to the very sick,
even if they cannot pay for it. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(“EMTALA”)25 mandates that hospitals that take Medicare, and virtually all do, to
stabilize patients who come to their emergency rooms with emergency conditions
even if they cannot pay for the care they need. Long before EMTALA, most
hospitals provided this charity care as part of their mission.26 This tradition of
assuring the availability of some minimal level of treatment without regard to
ability to pay reflects a collective decision that we, as a nation, are generally
unwilling to see others come to great harm from the inability to pay for medical
care.
There are many other unique attributes of health care that justify – indeed
require – restrictions on private actors in the health care system. Because medical
care is not an ordinary commodity, physicians owe their patients a duty27 to
provide care and are not free to contract over the terms of treatment in the same

25

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.

26

Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the
Twentieth Century (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999); Charles Rosenberg, The
Care of Strangers: The Rise of America’s Hospital System, (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1995); David Rosner, A Once Charitable Enterprise: Hospitals and Health
Care in Brooklyn and New York 1885-1915 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1982).
27

See Jill R. Horwitz, The Multiple Common Law Roots of Charitable Immunity:
An Essay in Honor of Richard Epstein’s Contributions to Tort Law, J. Tort L., Jan.
2010, at 29-33.
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manner as other buyers and sellers.28 For example, medical care providers must
ensure that their patients are informed before they give consent to their treatment.
Additionally, physicians are bound under a common law duty not to abandon their
patients once a physician-patient relationship is established. The physician has an
obligation to provide care throughout an episode of illness and may not terminate
the relationship unless specific restrictive conditions are met, such as when the
patient either dismisses the physician or the physician gives the patient sufficient
notice and opportunity to find alternate, sufficient treatment. 29 These
requirements for severing the physician-patient relationship apply even if the
patient cannot pay for his care.30
The obligation to provide medical care without regard to ability to pay
necessarily imposes costs that must be borne by others, either through taxes or

28

See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963)
(finding that even though a patient may understand the significance of a contract
releasing a hospital from potential liability in exchange for medical care, hospitals
may not benefit from these exculpatory clauses because of the special way in
which health care affects the public interest).
29

See, e.g., Saunders v. Lischkoff, 188 So. 815, 819 (Fla. 1939) (noting that the
obligation of continuing treatment can only be terminated “by the cessation of the
necessity which gave rise to the relation of physician and patient, or by the
discharge of the physician by the patient, or by the physician’s withdrawing from
the case, after giving the proper notice.” ); accord, e.g., Lewis v. Capalbo, 280
A.D.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Magana v. Elie, 439 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1982).
30

See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937) (finding that the doctor did
not give sufficient notice to allow his patient to procure other medical attention).
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through cost shifting that increases the costs to those who are able to pay, whether
personally or through insurance. Economists variously term these induced costs an
externality (a situation where one person’s actions or inactions affects others), a
free-rider problem (where people obtain a good and leave the costs to others), or a
Samaritan’s dilemma (where people choose not to prepare for emergencies,
knowing that others will care for them if needed). Even basic economics textbooks
stress that externalities require government intervention to improve the functioning
of the market.31
3.

Whether one person buys health insurance has cost
implications for everyone else

Economists recognize the importance of the time dimension to individual
decision-making. For most goods and services, the moment of purchase is
different from the moment of consumption (purchase almost always precedes
consumption). Thus, the decision to forgo insurance cannot be separated from the
consequences of being without insurance, and no economic model treats them as
separate. The consequences are three-fold. First, the decision not to purchase
insurance may be followed by illness, requiring medical care financed by others.
Second, people may forgo preventive care while uninsured (such as a mammogram
or colonoscopy) and as a result require more care later (for example, when

31

N. Gregory Mankiw, supra n.13.
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diagnosed with advanced cancer). Third, people may only receive partial care
when they are uninsured and sick, and then use more care when they become
insured.
In each of these circumstances, uninsured persons impose costs on others,
even if one does not seek medical care in the onset of an illness. Consequently, the
lack of health insurance has real and significant consequences for interstate
commerce that are appreciably different than any impact resulting from other
decisions to forego goods or types of insurance. Because health care providers are
required to care for the sick regardless of whether they have insurance or the
means to pay, and because medical care is so expensive, particularly for serious
illnesses, the cost of people choosing to forgo coverage is necessarily shared with
others. The medical care used by each uninsured person costs about $2,000 per
year, on average.32 Only 35 to 38 percent of this total is paid for by the uninsured

32

The Amici Economists argue that the targets of the mandate, those between 18
and 34 who are healthy and do not have health insurance, spent only $854 on
average for health care in 2010 and only $56 per year on average in total
emergency room care. Amici Br., supra n.7, at 13-14. That argument suffers from
several defects. First, the “targets” of the individual mandate are not limited to the
healthy under 34. Many over the age of 34 have elected not to purchase insurance.
They include, inter alia, those who were eligible for an employer-provided plan
but decided to not to purchase the insurance and those for whom health insurance
is too costly either because (i) they are ineligible to participate in an employer
program or (ii) the insurance costs, including only catastrophe coverage, on the
open market was beyond their means. For example, in 2008, the average nongroup policy for individuals aged 30-34 cost $2,104 and $4,512 for families. AHIP
Footnote continued on next page
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directly in out-of-pocket payments.33 This is not true of the other necessities,
including food, water, and clothing.
The remainder is financed in several ways. Thirty-two percent of the total is
paid for by providers charging higher prices to the insured, as providers “cost
shift” 34 from the uninsured to the insured. The total amount of cost shifting is over
$40 billion per year, and the resulting increase in private insurance premiums has
been estimated at between 1.7 percent35 and 8.7 percent.36 Another 14 percent of

Footnote continued from previous page

Ctr. for Policy and Research, Individual Health Insurance (Oct. 2009), available at
www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/2009IndividualMarketSurveyFinalReport.pdf; U.S.
Census Bureau, People Without Health Insurance Coverage by Selected
Characteristics: 2008 and 2009 tbl. 8, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2009/tab8.pdf.
Second, the average spent on health care or for an emergency room visit in a
year ignores the actual costs to the individual who requires care. During 2008, the
average costs for individuals who visited an emergency room was $1,203 and for
those who were hospitalized, the hospital cost was $7,921. See AHQR Tables,
supra n.15, at tbl. 5 (Hospital Inpatient Services-Median and Mean Expenses per
Person with Expense and Distribution of Expenses by Source of Payment (2008)),
available at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_results.jsp?compone
nt=1&subcomponent=0&tableSeries=1&year=1&SearchMethod=1&Action=Search.
33

AHQR Tables, supra n.15; Jack Hadley et al., Covering the Uninsured in 2008:
Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs, Health Affairs, Aug.
25, 2008, at w399-w415.
34

Hadley et al., supra n.33.

35

Id.
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the costs of the uninsured are paid for by government, through Medicare and
Medicaid payments, and the VA, TriCare (medical insurance for military personnel
and dependents), and workers’ compensation. Higher government costs
attributable to the uninsured are implicitly paid for by the insured as well, through
increased taxes or reductions in other government services as money is spent on
the uninsured. Finally, the remaining costs are generally either borne by the
health-care providers or covered by philanthropic contributions.
Moreover, even people who can avoid using medical care when they are
uninsured affect the amount paid by others in two ways. First, when some,
relatively healthier people, refrain from buying health insurance, that raises the
premiums of those who are insured, a phenomenon termed “adverse selection.”
Second, when people who were previously uninsured for a period of time obtain
coverage, they tend to consume more care, resulting in greater costs to the system.
They often have delayed seeking primary, preventive, and chronic care and thus
become sicker over time.37 When acute illness occurs, they may be insured
through public or private insurance, thus increasing the amount that those

Footnote continued from previous page
36

Families USA, Paying a Premium: The Added Cost of Care for the Uninsured 35
(June 2005), available at
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Paying_a_Premium_rev_July_13731e.pdf.
37

Comm’n on the Consequences of Uninsurance, Inst. of Medicine, Health
Insurance is a Family Matter 106 (2002).
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programs spend. For example, Medicare beneficiaries who were uninsured prior to
becoming eligible for Medicare used 51 percent more services than those who
were insured prior to Medicare eligibility.38 These costs are largely paid for by
people who are insured, who pay higher taxes for Medicare when they are
working, pay higher premiums for Part B coverage when they are enrolled in
Medicare, or receive fewer government services because of the higher cost of
Medicare.
Adverse selection causes health insurance premiums to increase due to a
smaller and less healthy pool of insured persons. The increased premiums also
cause additional people – many of whom are healthy – to opt out of the market,
raising prices even higher. The end result of this process of individuals opting-out
or waiting to purchase health insurance will be significantly lower coverage, and
possibly an unraveling of the market as a whole, what is widely termed an adverse
selection “death spiral.”39 In most states, insurers attempt to counter adverse
selection by discriminating against the ill, through denials of coverage or exclusion
of pre-existing conditions. These responses prevent those most in need from
accessing the cost-spreading benefits of insurance, thus defeating a fundamental
38

J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured
Medicare Beneficiaries, New Eng. J. Med., July 12, 2007, at 143-153.
39

David M. Cutler and Sarah Reber, Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-off
between Competition and Adverse Selection, Q. J. of Econ., May 1998, at 433-466.
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purpose of insurance and further compounding the problem of uncompensated
care.
Unfortunately, simply removing these tools from the reach of insurance
companies does not solve the problem; insurers respond by raising prices for all
market participants to offset their losses from selling to the sick. Several states
have tried mandating coverage of individuals with pre-existing conditions, nondiscrimination in insurance pricing, and other similar reforms of their markets for
individuals’ policies, without the equivalent of a minimum coverage requirement.
All of these experiments failed, and the states that tried them are now among the
most expensive places to buy non-group insurance.40 The only economic solution
to this dilemma is to ensure universal participation in insurance pools. The
minimum coverage requirement is a reasonable way to do this.
II.

Upholding Section 1501 Will Not Give Congress Unfettered Power to
Impose New Mandates on Individuals
The unique characteristics of health care described in the preceding section

also demonstrate why upholding the minimum coverage provision will not lead to
equivalent federal interventions in other markets. The combination of the
unavoidable need for medical care; the unpredictability of such need; the high cost
of care, which frequently far outstrips an individual’s or family’s ability to pay; the
40

Jonathan Gruber and Sara Rosenbaum, Buying Health Care, The Individual
Mandate, and the Constitution, New Eng. J. Med., July 29, 2010, at 401-03.
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fact that providers cannot refuse to provide care in emergency situations, and
generally will not in many other situations; and the very significant cost-shifting
that underlies the way medical care is paid for in this country, combine to create a
set of conditions and needs that do not exist in other contexts.41
While there are other necessities of life, they do not share the economic
characteristics of health care. Because the need for such items is relatively certain
in amount and time, people do not insure against the risk of not having food or
shelter. Rather, they plan for those needs, even when their means are limited. Nor
are grocery stores or landlords required to provide free food or housing to the
impecunious. So too, while many families purchase homes, purchasing a home is
a discretionary decision as living quarters can be rented.
By contrast, virtually all will require health care at some point, medical
providers are obligated to provide care, and the costs of much medical care –
especially the most-costly care – occur unpredictably. These expenses cannot be
deferred nor can care be provided in other ways. Rather, the costs incurred by the
uninsured are largely borne by others.

41

In Florida v. HHS, the court found that health care was not unique and that other
markets shared some of these characteristics. 2011 WL 3519178, Nos. 11-11021 &
11-11067, at *51-63 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011). However, the court focused on
these characteristics separately rather than in combination. Id. And, in none of
those markets must service be provided to those who cannot pay. Id.
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Similarly, Appellants’ attempt to equate health insurance with other forms of
insurance, such as burial, life, supplemental income, credit, mortgage guarantee,
etc.,42 is unavailing. Each of those forms of insurance involves risk-spreading, but
none deals with the combination of unavoidable need, unpredictable need,
unpredictable costs, the obligation to provide service, and the cost shifting that
characterizes the health care market. Several provide coverage for risks that may
not occur, e.g., mortgage guarantee insurance, and others are a form of savings
account, e.g. burial insurance, or a timing bet with an insurance company, e.g. term
life. The health care market is unique in its scope and characteristics, and none of
the parallels Appellants and others have attempted to draw with other markets
withstands analysis.
Congress enacted ACA to address failures in the health care insurance
market that make it prohibitively difficult for many individuals to afford or obtain
health insurance and produce escalating health care costs for consumers and
taxpayers.43 The decision to require most individuals who can afford it to obtain
health insurance is a reasonable approach, as a matter of economics, to satisfying
the Congress’s objectives in reforming health insurance and creating a fairer and
42

Appellants Br. at 57; see also Florida v. HHS, 2011 WL 3519178, Nos. 1111021 & 11-11067, at *52.
43

See Liberty Univ., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 633; Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894-95 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“Thomas More Law Ctr.
I”).
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more efficient health care system.44 The economic characteristics and principles
that underlie this conclusion are not common to other markets. None involves the
unavoidable need, the unpredictability, the high costs, the inability of providers to
refuse to provide treatment, and the very significant cost-shifting that underlies the
way medical care is paid for in this country. Section 1501 is a measured response
to these unique characteristics of the health care market. Upholding that necessary
corrective measure will not open the floodgates of unfettered federal power to
require individuals to purchase goods and services or engage in activity that may
be good for them.
III.

The Decision to Forgo Health Care Insurance Directly Affects Interstate
Commerce
A.

The Decision to Forgo Health Care Insurance Is Not a Passive
Decision

Appellants argue that the decision to eschew health insurance is not subject
to regulation under the Commerce Clause because it is “inactivity.” However, a
number of studies in health economics show that the decision to forgo purchasing
health insurance is not a passive act attributable to the passage of time or
inadvertence. Rather, it is a considered decision driven by economic factors.
Those studies indicate that the decision whether to purchase health insurance or not
44

See J. Gruber, Health Care Reform without the Individual Mandate, Ctr. for Am.
Progress (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/gruber_mandate.html.
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responds in a manner strongly predicted by models of forward-looking behavior,
and thus that many individuals forgo insurance as a result of strategic thinking.
One finding supporting this view is that about one-quarter of the uninsured
reject the offer of employer-sponsored insurance and remain uninsured, despite the
significant subsidies that virtually all employers offer for employer-sponsored
insurance.45 Other studies show that individuals are more likely to remain
uninsured when there are more sources of “uncompensated care” available, such as
public hospitals or hospitals that have high uncompensated care spending; the
availability of free care influences the decision to be covered.46
Strategic decision-making is also evidenced by studies showing that when
public insurance is expanded to some family members, such as children, families
will often drop insurance for all members of the family to take advantage of the
partial coverage for children. This exposes the ineligible family members to being
uninsured but leads to overall benefits for the family.47 Finally, evidence from

45

Jonathan Gruber and Ebonya Washington, Subsidies to Employee Health
Insurance Premiums and the Health Insurance Market, J. of Health Econ., Mar.
2005, at 253-76.
46

Kevin N. Rask and Kimberly J. Rask, Public Insurance Substituting for Private
Insurance: New Evidence Regarding Public Hospitals, Uncompensated Care
Funds, and Medicaid, J. of Health Econ., Jan. 19, 2000.
47

David Cutler and Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of Expanding the Medicaid
Program on Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Redistribution, Am. Econ.
Review, May 1996, at 368-73.
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Massachusetts shows that, even under the insurance mandate there, some people
signed up for insurance but terminated their coverage within a year. The
individuals who dropped coverage were much sicker than the typical person in the
market.48 The costs of allowing people to opt in and out of coverage – the
“adverse selection” – was estimated to increase insurance premiums by 0.5 to 1.5
percent, and ending this loophole – which Massachusetts has done – would lower
costs for everyone in the market by 1.2 percent. These data demonstrate that
forgoing health insurance is frequently not “inactivity,” as Appellants maintain, but
an affirmative, rational economic decision.
In Thomas More Law Center II, the Sixth Circuit recently recognized the
logical incoherence of the activity/inactivity distinction when it comes to insuring
against financial risk in the health care market.49 As Judge Sutton explained in his
controlling opinion:
[n]o one is inactive when deciding how to pay for health care, as selfinsurance and private insurance are two forms of action for addressing
the same risk. Each requires affirmative choices; one is no less active
than the other; and both affect commerce.50
48

Dianna K. Welch & Kurt Giesa, Oliver Wyman, Analysis of Individual Health
Coverage in Massachusetts Before and After the July 1, 2007 Merger of the Small
Group and Nongroup Health Insurance Markets 2-3 (June 2010), available at
http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/doi/Companies/adverse_selection_report.pdf.
49

2011 WL 255603, No. 10-2388, at *14, *29, *32-*33 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011)
(2-1 decision).
50

Id. at *29.
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In fact, starting with the basic premise that “inaction is action . . . when it comes to
financial risk,” Judge Sutton observed that “if done responsibly, [self-insuring]
requires more action (affirmatively saving money on a regular basis and managing
the assets over time) than [buying insurance] (writing a check once or twice a year
or never writing one at all if the employer withholds the premium).”51
B.

The Decision to Forgo Health Care Insurance Has a Material
Impact on Interstate Commerce

The failure to purchase health insurance has a direct impact on interstate
commerce. Those without medical insurance often ignore medical conditions at
their earlier stages and incur significantly greater costs when they ultimately seek
aid. So too, the decision to forgo some types of curative care can result in the need
for costlier care in the future, after the patient obtains coverage. The collective
effect of individual decisions not to purchase health insurance affects health
insurance premiums, the coverage which insurance companies can provide at
reasonable rates, and the extent to which the costs of caring for the uninsured are
borne by others, including taxpayers. The total costs of uncompensated care in
2008 alone were at least $43 billion.52
51

Id.

52

Congress used this figure, based on a Congressional Budget Office report, in
enacting ACA. However, it may understate the actual uncompensated costs in
2008. See Hadley, supra n.33, at 403 (estimating the cost of total uncompensated
care at $56 billion, of which $43 billion is the government portion.)
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The “Amici Economists” argued in Florida v. HHS that the real
uncompensated cost is only $8 billion. They arrive at that reduced figure by
arguing that certain categories of “uncompensated costs … will not be affected by
the individual mandate… .”53 Their analysis makes a number of errors in
describing those costs, and ignores the interrelationship between the independent
mandate and the insurance reforms adopted in the Act. Unfortunately, the Court in
Florida v. HHS accepted much of this analysis, notwithstanding its fundamental
flaws, and produced, in Amici’s view, an erroneous result.54
1.

The Amici Economists’ Analysis is flawed

The Amici Economists’ analysis contains at least the following errors:
a.

It excludes all of the costs of uncompensated care provided to

uninsured individuals with chronic conditions, asserted to amount to $8.7 billion.
They argue that, because ACA will make health insurance more broadly available,
those individuals will obtain insurance voluntarily. However, this argument
presumes that all individuals with any chronic condition are uninsured solely
because of a lack of availability, and ignores the likelihood that some in this group
– especially given the Amici Economists’ broad definition of chronic conditions
53

Amici Br., supra n.7, at 11. While $8.1 billion is less than $43 billion, it is not a
trivial sum.
54

Florida v. HHS, 2011 WL 3519178, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067, at *55 (11th
Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).
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(including asthma, arthritis and high blood pressure) – would choose to remain
uninsured even in a reformed market. More importantly, the analysis presumes
that market reforms required under ACA can be sustained in the absence of an
individual coverage requirement. As discussed below, this is a highly questionable
assumption.
b.

It assumes that any uncompensated care used by those below 133

percent of the poverty line should be ignored since those individuals will be
eligible for free Medicaid care. However, this claim mistakenly assumes that all of
these individuals are uninsured, when, in fact, some have insurance. Moreover, it
falsely assumes that everyone eligible for the expanded Medicaid would choose to
accept its coverage. Since there are millions of low income individuals now
eligible for free Medicaid coverage who do not sign up, that assumption is
debatable. Facing a minimum coverage requirement, these individuals would
likely be induced to sign up for Medicaid.
c.

It improperly subtracts roughly $8.1 billion in uncompensated care

allegedly attributable to “illegal aliens and other nonresidents” from the $43 billion
in uncompensated costs. But the question in the Medical Expenditure Panel
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Survey on which this analysis relies covers care used by all non-citizens.55 As
section 1501 includes anyone who is lawfully present in the United States,56 the
$8.1 billion includes lawful residents who are subject to the minimum coverage
requirement.
d.

It incorrectly excludes $3.3 billion of uncompensated care due to the

insured who do not make their co-pays or other out-of-pocket expenses. However,
the $43 billion includes only costs due to the uninsured, and the $3.3 billion in
costs attributable to insured people is not part of the total.
In addition to these flaws, the analysis ignores the fact that the $43 billion
figure reflects 2008 costs. Updating the uncompensated care amounts to account
for health care inflation by the time of the mandate’s implementation in 2014
would increase the total to perhaps $58 billion, assuming projections.57 Given the
rise of the uninsured since 2008, the likely figures may be even higher.
Consequently, the Amici Economists’ attempt to demonstrate that those subject to

55

Leighton Ku, Health Insurance Coverage and Medical Expenditures of
Immigrants and Native-Born Citizens in the United States, Am. J. of Pub. Health,
July 2009, at 1322-28.
56

See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d).

57

Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditure
Projections 2009-2019 (Sept. 2010), available at
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/NHEProjections2009t
o2019.pdf .
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the mandate, i.e., those without health insurance who would respond only to the
mandate, have little impact on health care costs is seriously flawed.
2.

The Amici Economists Ignore the Importance of the Mandate to
the Insurance Reforms Adopted in the Act

More fundamentally, the Amici Economists’ assertion that the $43 billion
can be discounted because of coverage which the Act will make available ignores
the interaction of the individual mandate and the guaranteed coverage and the
community rating provisions of the Act. As discussed above, the decisions as to
when and whether to acquire or drop coverage can affect whether these reforms
can be maintained. Thus, for example, the collective effect of individual decisions
to purchase insurance once a medical condition arises or on the way to the
emergency room or to drop coverage once the condition is resolved, could lead to
the “death spiral” discussed above: healthy people drop out of the market,
insurance premiums rise, and more people are induced to drop coverage.
One goal of the mandate, as explicitly recognized section 1501(a)(2)(I), is to
“broaden the health risk pool” in order to minimize the chances of such
unraveling.58 This is not purely a theoretical possibility: As noted above, the few
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Studies of the Massachusetts experience indicates that the mandate actually
encourages healthier individuals to purchase insurance. Amitabh Chandra et al.,
The Importance of the Individual Mandates -- Evidence from Massachusetts, N.
Engl. J. Med., Jan. 27, 2011, at 293-95, available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/gruber_mandate.pdf.
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states that experimented with insurance market reforms of this type without a
mandate saw the unraveling of their non-group markets and skyrocketing
premiums. Consequently, the validity of the Amici Economists’ analysis, even
assuming arguendo that their numbers are correct, turns on the continued
availability of the insurance market reforms in the Act. Without the mandate,
those reforms may not be sustainable, leaving millions reliant on uncompensated
care for their health care needs.59
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Amici urge the Court, if it reaches the merits,
to uphold section 1501. Spreading the costs of medical care across the broad
spectrum of the population that will require medical assistance is essential to
reforming the health care system in the United States and achieving the legitimate
goals of the Act. While the minimum coverage requirement may appear unique, it
is, as an economic matter, consistent with other obligations imposed under the
Commerce Clause. It regulates economic decisions that have a substantial impact
on the national market for health care. Given the unique economic characteristics
of health care, upholding this necessary corrective measure will not grant Congress
59
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unfettered federal power to require individuals to purchase goods and services, to
engage in activity that may be good for them, or usurp the police powers of the
States.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ M. Sean Laane
M. Sean Laane
Richard L. Rosen*
Michael D. Thorpe*
Aarash Haghighat*
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP
555 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 942-5000
Attorneys for the Economic Scholars

* Not Admitted in the Eighth Circuit
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